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University of Waikato

Netherlands Defence Academy/University of Tilburg

For close to 50 years, so-called ‘dons’ have positioned themselves as civic leaders in Jamaica, gaining
acceptance among poor urban communities and (tacit) political recognition in the wider society. The
dons’ systematic, coercive organisation of the ghetto community and the counter-hegemonic, executivestyle bureaucracy and culture entrenched here resembles the ‘godfather’-led criminal culture and power
of the (Italian) Mafia. However, over the last ten years the Mafia has faced a considerable decline in its
omnipotence, due to increased state intervention and resistance within civil society, particularly by
women in the local Italian communities. This article attempts to ascertain if such a ‘reversible destiny’ is
also thinkable in Jamaica.

International concern in recent years with a range of deviant political and social
phenomena (terrorism, organised crime, migration) has coincided with scholarly
anxiety over emerging threats to world order and the consequent risks to the
power and authority of the contemporary state. Political challenges to the exclusivity of state authority have mainly arisen from a wide assemblage of ‘rogue
actors’ – Mafias, terrorists, criminal gangs and warlords. Many of these groups not
only establish large informal organisations and governing structures with their
own economic, security and administrative apparatuses, but they pervade whole
territories within the border lands of many countries throughout the world.
Examples include al Qa’eda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, the spread of organised crime inside and outside Europe (Italy, Russia, Albania, China and Japan),
drug cartels and rebels in Colombia and Mexico, the private militias operating in
places such as Sudan, Solomon Islands, Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Haiti, as well as the criminal gangs in the Brazilian favelas. On account of existing
within a subculture with their own norms, rules and ways of dispensing justice,
these networks of ‘outlaws’ are seen as powerful ‘alternate authorities’ which are
giving a social basis to political order (and disorder) in many societies (Kaplan,
2000; Mason, 2005; Rapley, 2006; Soeters, 2005; Strange, 1996; UNDP, 1994).
In this vein, social science scholars in Jamaica have been increasingly preoccupied
with the emergence of ‘community dons’ and their significance for the public
safety and security dilemma confronting the Jamaican state (Charles, 2002;
Harriot, 2003; Price, 2004; Rapley, 2003). Jamaica’s dons are considered to be a
prime example of ‘rogue leadership’ in the civil sphere. ‘Rogue leaders’ in civil
society evolve where and when the state is too weak or too involved with other
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priorities to control the monopoly of violence and ensure good governance,
safety and public order in everyday life.Within the global context, Jamaican dons
are therefore not unique in using illegitimate violence to gain power and exercise
control of the everyday life and politics in their communities. To get a better
understanding of Jamaican donmanship, Jamaica’s dons may be compared with
the ‘godfather’-like extra-legal culture of the Mafia in Italy and elsewhere, the
USA in particular.1 In this article we aim to elaborate this comparison. By
delineating the culture of donmanship in Jamaica within the context of the global
Mafia phenomenon, we argue that the character of the social organisation over
which Mafia dons preside handicaps ‘civil’ leadership at the local community
level, foregrounds ‘rogue leadership’ and frustrates the development of civil norms
and civil politics.
However, pursuing the comparison a bit further may also offer some hope of a
better future. Over the last decade, the Mafia in Italy – and in the USA – has
encountered a serious decline of its power ( Jamieson, 2000; Reuter, 1995;
Schneider and Schneider, 2005; 2003). One even speaks of a ‘reversible destiny’ for
the communities in those nations, for instance in Italian regions like Sicily and
Calabria. One may wonder if those fairly new developments in Italy and the USA
may show the way to future improvements with respect to ‘rogue leadership’ in
Jamaica. This is the fundamental question we address in the article. To reach for
a substantiated answer, we first analyse the rise of the Mafia, subsequently define
Jamaican donmanship, then scrutinise the conditions that led to the decline of
Mafia power in Italy and the USA, and finally we attempt to appreciate if and
how these conditions may apply to Jamaican society, now or in the near future.
As a point of departure, we make a short methodological note. This article uses
the commonalities and differences in culture, political dynamics and leadership
which exist between the Mafia and Jamaican dons to theorise the development
of outlaw governance in the civil community. Although there is a multiplicity
of Mafia groups in existence – Russian, Albanian and American – we rely heavily
on the data of the Italian Mafia to carve out parallels with the Jamaican case. This
is not only because the Mafia had its origins in Italy, but – for a long time – it has
also been the ‘winning model’ of organised crime in the world (Blok, 2001;
Jamieson, 2000; Spotts and Wieser, 1986). This article therefore deals with the
emergence of alternative sovereign spaces, outlaw forms of community governance and their apparent institutionalisation in different national and political
contexts. No two societies are more different in terms of size, political institutions,
political culture, economic structure and history than Jamaica and Italy. Consequently, even while we draw comparisons between these two settings, which is a
so-called ‘most dissimilar’ comparative strategy (Przeworski and Teune, 1970), we
are aware that this comparative effort is far from robust. Nonetheless, we think
that this approach will help us to understand the patterns that enable ‘rogue
leadership’ in civil society to occur and also to be marginalised and repressed.
Such patterns may point to developments occurring on a worldwide scale.
© 2007 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2007 Political Studies Association
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The Politics of the (Italian) Mafia
The ‘Mafia’ originally referred to a loose confederation of Sicilian ‘families’ or
‘brotherhoods’, who established themselves as law enforcement squads in western
Sicily, tenuously during the reign of the Neapolitan kingdom of the Two Sicilies
in the early nineteenth century, and forcefully after the Unification of Italy in
1860. The Mafia claimed to be a force for law and order that the governing
authority in Naples and after 1870 in Rome could not ensure. Members of the
Mafia did not consider themselves as criminals; indeed they were regarded by the
populace as ‘protectors’, hence their entrenchment in the social fabric of a local
area. The most affected locales were the rural towns of the interior zone of large
estates or latifundia and the villages and hamlets near Palermo, the regional
capital, given over to the commercial development of orchard crops (Blok, 2001).
This ‘protector’ role has persisted until very recently in the Mafia’s ‘guardianship’
over large sections of southern Italian territory. The contemporary Mafia is
characterised by two significant developments: (1) its geographic spread not only
throughout Italy but its transnational linkages throughout Europe, North and
South America as well as Asia (although their presence here is recent and minor
by comparison); (2) the organisation’s infiltration of legitimate business activities.
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, drug trafficking alone garnered staggering
sums. These monies have been channelled into legitimate enterprises: vacation
resorts, restaurants, construction firms and transportation companies (Blok, 2001;
Jamieson, 2000; Spotts and Wieser, 1986).
In general, the Mafia’s activities include the gamut of extra-legality: extortion,
usury, skimming public works contracts, trafficking drugs, arms, contraband
cigarettes, money laundering and the reinvestment of the illicit profits. Indeed,
although it directly or indirectly acquires the management of businesses, concessions, authorisations, public contracts and public services, extortion is at the heart
of the Mafia’s trade and the key to its power (Spotts and Wieser, 1986, p. 188;
compare Blok, 2001; Jamieson, 2000; Stille, 1995). The Mafia operates protection
rackets over almost every sort of commercial activity, extorting pay-offs from some
10,000 large and small enterprises. This ‘revenue’ provides employment for the
lower cadres (of the Mafia structure), a stable income to support the families of
those imprisoned and, crucially, represents a form of social control through which
economic and political influence can be exerted over a given territory. Of analytic
purchase here is not so much the tight grip that extra-legal forces have on national
economies, but the hegemony they claim over crucial areas of social life.
The Mafia’s construction of enduring social structures outfitted with its own
laws, policing and justice systems is a case in point. This development underlines
what some scholars now characterise as organised ‘counter-government’ and/or
‘counter-society’ (Strange, 1996; compare Mason, 2005; Charles, 2002). These
‘counter-societies’ often stand in direct competition, or attempt to supplant – in
a peculiar mirror fashion – the legitimate authority of the state. While it may
© 2007 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2007 Political Studies Association
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indeed be argued, as Christopher Charles (2002) and Susan Strange (1996) do,
that there has been a radical ‘power shift’ away from the state, the Mafia’s historical
model instead reveals an entwined relationship with the Italian state, in which, as
suggested by the Italian expression ‘pieces of the state’, it is impossible to tell
where the legitimate state leaves off and the Mafia begins. In this scenario of
Mafia penetration of (regional) government, power is, in effect, shared between
two hegemons ( Jamieson, 2000). Each force would therefore only attack its
political competitor as a response to an initial attack. This ‘stable’ and matted
coexistence resulted from the symbiotic interdependent relationship fostered
between both ‘sovereignties’. Acting as a kind of shadow government, the Mafia
for years had maintained order and delivered votes on behalf of the Italian
government (e.g. Chubb, 1996). By Strange’s (1996, p. 115) argument, so integrated into the society had the organisation become that ‘the state delegated to
the Mafiosi the functions of social inter-mediation, protection of property and
persons and the preservation of order’.
Indeed, Frederic Spotts and Theodor Wieser (1986) argue that within the context
of the chaotic conditions of Bourbon Naples, the Camorra – the Italian Mafia
network in Campania, to be distinguished from the Cosa Nostra in Sicily and the
N’drangheta in Calabria – was, at times, the city’s only force for order. It is
important, however, to question the premise on which a state sanctions, both
symbolically and in practice, this alternative sovereignty. In the case of Italy, the
historical blurring of the lines between legality and extra-legality throughout
contemporary public life had, for all intents and purposes, paved the way for a
passive acceptance of the Mafia as part and parcel of the politics of everyday life.
Secondly, it would appear that the Italian state had compromised itself because –
in the context of the Cold War – the ruling political parties, above all the
Christian Democratic party, needed the votes that the Mafia could arrange in
order to remain in power and exclude the Communists from the government
(Chubb, 1996, pp. 277–8; Ginsborg, 1990). As a consequence, the Italian government became too compromised and enfeebled to enforce the law or protect its
own citizens, hence their reliance on alternative orders for security and protection, albeit precarious. Conversely, the state relied too actively on the Mafia to
assume some of the functions it no longer could perform. It is this entwinement,
and hence fundamental weakness in state authority, which empowers alternative
authorities and permits them to establish a degree of legitimacy with, to quote
Ann Mason (2005, p. 42),‘non-citizens who lack a social contract with the State’.
The Mafia has also been able to achieve ‘consent’ through the provision of basic
services (such as protection) to the poor, coercion and sometimes genuine affinity
or filial bonds. In addition, the Mafia gained legitimacy and was condoned
because it also provided services to the wealthy and powerful.
Of course, this is not to say that brutal violence and predatory actions against the
people they claim to ‘protect’ have not undermined and ultimately called into
question the legitimacy of these alternative authorities. Nevertheless, in the main,
© 2007 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2007 Political Studies Association
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they have managed to establish, maintain and consolidate rudimentary social
orders within communities spurned by ‘official’ civil society and neglected by
central government policies. The Mafia’s autocratic, albeit invisible, control of
aspects of the social realm has succeeded for such a long time because the
organisation guaranteed the strict observance of its code of rules by employing
coercive measures. Blackmail and extortion were prominent among the sanctions
applied, while murder has always been the ultimate instrument for maintaining
authority and settling internal disputes. Although a threat or a bribe is usually
enough to ensure silence or compliance and to disseminate and enforce political
rules, murder can be stunningly efficacious – it automatically becomes an
example to others, ensures the smooth conduct of business and effortlessly
promotes the political rules. Mafia killings in general did not produce a queue of
witnesses as the code of ‘omertà’ (silence) guaranteed that no-one talked to the
police or magistrates. Invoked in the Italian adage,‘chi parala muore, chi tace campa’
(‘who talks dies, who is silent lives’) and inbred within the consciousness of many
Italians, omertà has for long been a central element of the Mafia’s political strategy
(Spotts and Wieser, 1986).
Although fundamentally covert, it is clear that given its extraordinary influence
on the use of public finance (public works contracts), elections and the functioning of particular institutions, the Mafia had, in significant ways, become an active
participant in public life and a hegemonic power holder within the civil sphere.
While it does not appear to have a coherent social project or even a revolutionary
intent, by the very character of its leadership and the nature of its activities, it
posed a grave threat to the rule of law and civil governance in this context. Of
critical analytic purchase is that, as the Italian state surrendered some of its power
and perpetuated the notion of ‘shared sovereignty’, it also renounced its right to
the management and control of large constituencies of citizens. This situation has
always been problematic as it allowed the Mafia sovereign space to undercut the
legal, political and social citizenship rights and duties that exist within the
legitimate, higher authority of the Italian state. In the meantime, the Mafia has
accumulated capital, pursued power and entrenched its cultural code.As a tightly
knit extra-legal organisation, it has been highly legitimated and institutionalised
while civil society’s right to liberty and security at the ‘community’ level has been
compromised.An explicit reproduction of this kind of ‘mob’ culture is evident in
contemporary Jamaica. Rooted in local urban communities, it is headed by dons,
hence the scholarly designation, donmanship.

Characterising Jamaican Donmanship
Drawing explicitly on the idea of the Mafia don, mob boss or ‘godfather’, the
concept ‘don’ in local Jamaican parlance is synonymous with masculine designations such as ‘big man’ or ‘fada’ (father). These titles refer to individuals possessed
of material wealth, popularity and influence such as entertainers, politicians and
drug lords. However, although denoting affluence, rank and authority, a don is not
© 2007 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2007 Political Studies Association
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merely a person in charge. Instead, he is a self-styled ‘politically connected local
leader who wields power, status and prestige derived from multiple sources and
activities, legal and illegal’ (Price, 2004, p. 79). He also assumes leadership over
specific geographical areas called ‘garrisons’, hence the current popularity of the
title ‘area leader’. Although the roles of each often collapse and become blurred,
it is conceptually inaccurate to classify all area leaders as dons. Neither can it be
presupposed that all dons perform or even possess the capabilities to perform all
the functions of an area leader. Indeed, some communities retain both an area
leader and a don as separate individuals who share governorship over the same
area. Using the analogy of a republic, the don, in such a case, is the ‘executive
president’ while the area leader assumes a ‘prime ministerial’ role and is essentially
charged with running the area’s day-to-day political and ‘diplomatic’ agenda. This
analytical distinction is significant because it demonstrates the radical metamorphosis which has taken place in the structure of civil leadership at the community
level in urban Jamaica.
This is because area leaders were typically charismatic community residents with
organisational capability and political savvy. They were central participants and
leaders in a wider structure of power within the urban area comprising a gamut
of community-based organisations – youth groups, sports clubs, church groups,
school and youth initiatives, neighbourhood watches, citizen associations and a
multiplicity of informal networks and relationships. In other words, the emergence and prominence of an area leader required active participation in the
community and the assistance they provided to fellow residents. On this account,
these individuals engendered the respect of members of their community and, at
times, wider recognition among civil society. Some traditional area leaders remain
locally recognised and continue to play vital roles in citizen activities and initiatives. Their previous political influence and capacity to engage with and impact
on the community have, however, diminished substantially, having been outstripped by a new kind of leader who is equally legitimate in the eyes of many in
the community. This new area leader, called ‘don’, ‘is extremely wealthy and has
a welfare system, is politically connected and protected, has the organized support
of a large section of the community and a security structure to defend his turf and
power’ (Charles, 2002, p. 41).2
Long before the watershed national elections of 1980 catapulted members of
Jamaica’s criminal underworld into political significance, cunning figures were
already building political alliances, positioning themselves as civic leaders and
cementing their place within the structure of leadership of local urban communities. Obika Gray (2003), in an intriguing historical account of the careers of
Jamaica’s most notorious gang leaders, identifies Claude Massop, George ‘Feathermop’ Spence,Winston ‘Burry Boy’ Blake and Dennis ‘Copper’ Barth as among
many career criminals who rose to prominence in the slums in the early 1960s.
On the basis of their individual pursuit of social honour and material betterment
as well as their attainment of political clout, heroic status and folk following
© 2007 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2007 Political Studies Association
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among the so-called ‘lumpens’ in the slums of Kingston, these outlaws are the
most evident precursors to the present cohort of dons and the entrenchment of
a new kind of community leadership and social organisation in urban Jamaica. It
is worthy of note that all this was happening within the context of international
developments such as the American civil rights movement and the rise of ‘Black
Power’, intense student protests and other social movements. The era also coincided with nationalist movements at home and across the Afro-Caribbean
diaspora, which culminated with Jamaica’s independence in 1962 as well as the
increasing popularity of Rastafarian culture and religion as well as reggae music.
Reggae itself was disseminating a message of hope and resistance to oppression.
Independence in 1962 symbolised a significant break from a colonial past and the
attendant search for political identity and self-actualisation. It was also a time
when new economic expectations clashed with political reality. For example,
despite sustained economic growth in the period between 1962 and 1972,
unemployment, poor housing and extreme poverty characterised the life of the
black majority at the bottom end of Jamaican society (Franklyn, 2001; Kaufman,
1985; Manley, 1974; Stone, 1980). Crime was instrumental to the survival of the
poorest. Indeed, the term ‘rude bwoy’ (boy) came to characterise members of the
Jamaican lower class who were totally disenchanted with the ruling system and
who resorted to criminality for economic survival. Brandishing ratchet knives,
machetes and later guns, the rude bwoys created large and small gang networks
and participated in extreme acts of violence and banditry. Their deprived status
justified their fury against the social system and elevated them as (extra-legal)
symbols of emerging subaltern power. The immortalisation of a ‘rudie culture’
saw violence also employed as an instrument of political protest. In other words,
criminality jelled with politics as thugs became political enforcers and contractors
and effectively defined post-independence political organisation of the urban
community. In what many commentators saw as (political party) ‘civil wars’, slum
dwellers closed ranks around the poles of the Jamaica’s political divide – the
socialist-oriented People’s National party (PNP) and the right-wing Jamaica
Labour party ( JLP) and behind politically recruited rebel leaders.
This ‘tribal’ politics encouraged in the slums a sort of ‘top-ranking’ leadership
comprising those who were able to gain promotion to the ranks of political
enforcer and acquire the requisite political clout and protection (Charles, 2002;
Gray 2003; Rapley, 2003). These political mercenaries did not belong to a
centralised leadership structure. Much like the urban-based Neapolitan Camorra,
this absence of centralised leadership within the Jamaican slum community for
twenty years (1960–80) promulgated a clan-based structure of power run by
urban gang leaders. They fostered dynamic interdependent relationships with the
political system which allowed them access to institutional channels of survival
and political clout. It is this arrangement which really conferred dons with much
credibility and power within the local community. Certainly, their capacity for
murderous brutality and their enduring reputation as (political) mercenaries
© 2007 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2007 Political Studies Association
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cemented their power within the social space of the ghetto and their hold on civil
society. Radical shifts in the global economy after 1980 were to alter even further
the political dynamics of community organisation in the Jamaican slum, making
way for the consolidation of a notorious dynasty of dons and the retreat of civil
leadership. We now look more closely at the manifestations of ‘rogue rule’ in
Jamaican civil society.

The ‘Presidential’ Rule of Garrisons
Willie [Haggart] was a Godfather to the youths in the area. He helped to send a lot
of kids to school, he had businesses, him employ youths from the area, and he was
involved in contract work which helped a lot of unemployed man get jobs (Claude
Mills, 2001, The Jamaica Gleaner, 20 May 2001).
A don really and truly is the government around here. Take for example Tivoli
[referring to the West Kingston community of Tivoli Gardens] and Dudus [reputed
‘don’ of Tivoli] – rape, no, we don’t work with that around here; robbery, no, we
don’t work with that, those kinds of things. Everybody just meet under one order
and those who come to upset that order – well, you have to make up your mind.
The sheriff [referring to Dudus] is in town (emphases added).3

Not unlike the Italian Mafia ‘godfather’,Willie Haggart – the deceased area leader
of Lincoln Crescent in South St Andrew and the inner city clique, Black Roses
Crew (read as gang) – alongside his counterparts ‘Zekes’ and ‘Dudus’, exemplify
the cadre of prominent citizens who emerged after 1980 with menacing authority in Jamaican inner-city communities, some of which have acquired the notorious label ‘garrisons’. To comprehend fully the new style of social arrangement
and community governance they enacted in the context of Jamaica’s highly
charged political culture and socio-political environment, one must first come to
grips with the emergence of the alternative sovereign space or autocratic site of
socio-political action as embedded in the whole garrison phenomenon:
A garrison is a political stronghold, a veritable fortress completely controlled by the
dominant [political] party. Any significant social, political, economic or cultural
development within the garrison can only take place with the tacit approval of the
leadership (local or national) of the dominant party. The garrison is therefore, in its
extreme form, a totalitarian social space in which the lives of those who live within
its boundaries are effectively controlled. Indeed, the core garrison exhibits an
element of extraterritoriality, they are states within a state (Figueroa, 1994, p. 6).

These rigidly defined zones, popular among them the Tivoli Gardens, Jungle,
Rema, Payne Land, Jones Town, Grant’s Pen and Backbush garrison communities, had their fateful beginnings, according to Obika Gray (2003, p. 13), as
early as the 1940s when Jamaica’s two principal political parties, the JLP and the
PNP,‘recruited ruffians, worthies and other notables from the ghetto as partisans
for their [electoral] cause’. The presence of dons and the impact of garrisons on
Jamaican electoral politics continued to intensify but was only ‘officially’ acknowl© 2007 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2007 Political Studies Association
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edged nearly 50 years later, after the volatile 1980 general elections took the lives
of over 800 citizens in campaign violence alone. Current scholarship boldly links
the institutionalisation of garrison communities to the drive by politicians
assigned to these belts to win elections and guarantee the continued electoral
loyalty of voters. According to the dynamics of the politics of patron clientelism
(Stone, 1980), the construction of large-scale housing solutions was the irresistible
offer to inner-city residents as barter for their electoral and political support. This
vote seeking through resource distributions became an ingrained aspect of Jamaica’s political culture, driven by the systematic and strategic dispersal of statesponsored largesse (money, contracts, land and jobs) in a discriminatory and
politically partisan fashion within the inner city.
This political strategy, usually employed by the Member of Parliament to augment
his or her party’s support base and mass appeal, is designed to keep the party
supporters faithful and entice rival supporters to switch allegiances. Like the
Italian Mafiosi, who obtained public works contracts and employment for their
clients in government agencies, in exchange for delivering votes, Jamaica’s dons
form the core of political leadership and organisation at the community level.
Politicians delegate to them the functions of encouraging voter loyalty and
unseating opponents. State funds are often discharged to dons under the guise of
initiating development projects such as house building, restoring derelict state
properties, school repairs, renovating sidewalks, drainage and gully cleaning and
sometimes the staging of ‘community’ events such as dances. In order to ensure
that their respective parties hold the cash cow over the next few years, dons
enforce territorial and political allegiance on those domiciled within garrisons by
employing fierce violence, intimidation and fraud. In return for constructing
communities and constituencies that are essentially homogeneous in their overt
political behaviour, a don secures for himself legitimacy, prestige, status, wealth
and assurance from his political patron of protection from the law (Rapley, 2003;
Charles, 2002; Figueroa, 1994).
Indeed, so intertwined within the fabric of Jamaican politics and society had rogue
actors become that,in recent years,high-ranking ministers and political officials were
to be seen in attendance at the funerals of prominent dons,some of whose memorial
services received official state authorisation to be held at the National Arena, a
recognised venue ordinarily reserved for public events (Ritch, 2001).
By employing similar economic organisation and effectively replicating the criminal
tactics of the globalised Mafia, Jamaican dons are today multi-millionaires, accumulating significant wealth from three broad streams of organised crime: (1) illicit
trafficking in narcotics, guns and contraband; (2) money laundering, fraud and
reinvestment of illicit profits into the formal economy;and (3) extortion,especially
the skimming of public works contracts, illegal gambling and burglary. Like the
Mafia, extortion is big business for Jamaican dons. It is a critical mainstay of their
capital base, pulling in an estimated yearly income of up to J$400 million
(€4,787,175.23;US$6,066,580.72),and it provides steady employment and income
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for the ‘generals’ and ‘shottas’ (shooters) in the structure of command (Henry, 2000;
Mills, 2000). The politics of extortion is analytically significant as it provides a
window to the dons’ economic power and makes clear the fundamental role it plays
in their control of the social space. Highly organised and flourishing, the extortion
scheme in urban Jamaica is most acute in the Red Hills Road and business district
areas of downtown Kingston. Extortion often disguises itself as a form of civic
enterprise, a ‘charity’ or ‘community development effort’ where monies are
demanded ‘to assist the youths in the area’ or youths who are in prison, but ultimately it involves the collection of ‘taxes’ (cash or merchandise) from merchants,
market higglers and street vendors.Street vendors are forced to pay up to J$500 (€6;
US$8) weekly while larger retailers can be charged as much as J$40,000–
$50,000 (€479–598.23; US$607–758.23) monthly (Mills, 2000).
It also masks a sort of ‘unofficial’ security industry, whereby money is paid for the
protection of municipal buildings and private businesses by higglers wishing to
lessen the propensity of being robbed. The problem of extortion has raised the
issue of business ethics as an area of concern in Jamaica. In a fascinating exploratory piece for the Jamaica Gleaner, reporters Claude Mills and Balford Henry argue
that the extortion industry has the tacit support of Jamaican state and business
persons, from whom monies are being solicited. Their research shows that the
Jamaican government, through the established municipal authority – Kingston
and St Andrew Corporation (KSAC), often disburses hefty sums – up to J$3.1 m
(€35,912.78; US$45,499.36) to dons in 2001, to undertake the refurbishing of
markets in the ‘downtown’ business district. In other instances, they are contracted
to provide/arrange the security detail for the markets, construction sites of
development projects and/or assist with the relocation of vendors in the Kingston
Metropolitan Area (KMA) at a bi-weekly cost of half a million dollars. Local
council revenue such as that accrued from the ‘rent’ paid by motorists for public
parking spaces also rests in the pockets of dons (see Mills, 2000, The Jamaica
Gleaner, September 1; Henry, 2000, The Jamaica Gleaner, January 31). These illicit
practices have become entrenched because the dons ensure compliance by
vandalising, burglarising or killing those unwilling to abide by the rules of this
extra-legal economic system. A total of ten businessmen were killed between
1993 and 2003 for reportedly refusing to comply with the demands of extortionists (see Mills, 2000, The Jamaica Gleaner, September 1; Henry, 2000, The
Jamaica Gleaner, January 31). Dons have thus become established patrons in their
own right, with connection and clout, and thereby claim the right to autonomous
governance of the urban community. Within the context of this kind of garrisonisation of the urban neighbourhood, one is in effect a prisoner, a hostage to the
don. We look briefly at how this system of (outlaw) governance works.

In the Courtyard of Dons
Community donmanship represents the ghetto’s version of a feudal monarchy.
Here, the maximum leader, like the Mafia boss, is the don who is surrounded by
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a handpicked band of elite generals and shottas. The exception, which carries
significant purchase in the conceptualisation of ‘rogue leadership’, is that unlike
the party boss, the don is not bounded by legality, human rights or the rules of
democratic participation. He may instead traverse between the realms of legality
and illegality according to his own whim. Like the Mafia boss or party maximum
leader, it is the don who takes critical decisions concerning the running of the
community. These include its guiding principles, laws and rules and the penalties
for breach of those rules, the staging of events and the implementation of
development projects. Justice, security of person and property and the preservation of order, which are emphasised as central elements of a strong state, are also
crucial to the leadership of the garrison community.
Retaining control over ready militias and large criminal organisations, dons
usually have a personal stake in successfully defending the community from rival
political or criminal gangs and ‘protecting’ its members from the police and
punishment from legitimate state authority. By recycling some of the proceeds
of their criminal work, dons have also effectively delegated to themselves the
state functions of ‘welfare’ within garrison communities. From organising ‘bashment’ bus rides and beach trips, dancehall sessions and kids’ treats to paying
tuition fees, buying school uniforms and books as well as providing employment
to youths, the civic charity of the Jamaican don is undeniable. The benefits of
living under the rule of a don are not necessarily manifested individually. One
gains simply by being a member of a particular community, participating in its
activities and accepting its norms. These benefits include living in a government
house rent/mortgage free or without a registered title to the premises and never
having to pay electricity or water bills. As one insider of the inner city told the
first author:
If you check Jones Town,Tivoli Gardens, Arnett Gardens, Hannah Town, you find
that if a resident dies, then there might be some sort of a raffle held to determine
who should get the house which is left behind. There are times when the dons
arbitrate in this matter. If there is a family member living in the community and he
has children, naturally the house will be given to the children but if he alone lives
there, the house will be handed down, whether you like it or not, to anyone who
need it more. So sometimes there is a jostling for tenancy. The community often
respects the decision and the decision is final (Personal Communication, 2004;
compare Charles, 2002; Rapley, 2003).

Dons also derive benefits and legitimacy from constructing and maintaining
strong bonds and affective ties with community members. Indeed, the violent
protests staged by massive numbers of inner-city residents in September 1998 on
behalf of Mathews Lane don, Donald Phipps (aka ‘Zekes’) were motivated, in
part, by the strong emotional attachments and sentiment that residents felt
towards him. This was expressed in seemingly genuine fear of his potential
mistreatment in detention by the police (see Charles, 2002; Johnson, 2005a;
Price, 2004). It is worthy of note that part of this affinity stems from the don’s
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personal affluence and his capacity to extend welfare to members of his community. Conditions of squalor, violence, fear, unemployment and profound material deprivation characterise garrison communities, thus intensifying the needs of
citizens for protection and economic security. The awareness that these benefits
may only be derived from their patron–client contract with dons forces some
slum dwellers to depend exclusively on ‘handouts’ and to become fiercely loyal to
the proverbial hand that feeds them.
However, although significant, wealth and kinship ties are not the only weapons
in the armoury of tools used by the dons to keep their power concentrated and
residents compliant. Of theoretical and political significance is their heavyhandedness when undertaking social arbitration and dispensing justice in the civil
sphere. Rather than the legitimate state authority, embodied in the police, crimes
within the garrison are reported to the don. Disputes over social interactions,
financial transactions and domestic relationships are mediated and settled personally and according to the entrenched norms and rules of the community. As a
counter to the slowness of law enforcement and the elusiveness of ‘justice’ in
mainstream society, justice in the garrison is swift. Our empirical research coincides with prevailing scholarship which reveals that a sort of ‘kangaroo court’ or
‘street corner’ court is usually established in which the dons assume the twin roles
of judge and jury. In this fabricated judicial system, a chicken coop is used as a
‘holding cell’, where the accused is detained while the don, who also adopts the
police function, investigates. The individual is then tried and invariably found
guilty. Punishment is the task of the lower command of shottas. Severe infractions
such as theft, disobeying or ‘dissing’ (disrespecting) the don and rape may attract
a severe beating or the death penalty.Women in particular champion this extrajudicial system because they tend to be most vulnerable to criminals and rapists
and are often spared the lengthy investigations and trauma that attend the formal
system (Charles, 2002; interview, 2004).
It is worth noting here that high levels of corruption within the Jamaica Constabulary Force as well as persistent reports of ‘police brutality’ and excessive use
of force have not only sullied the credibility of the police in the eyes of the
Jamaican public but consolidated the role of dons. For example, some constables
have become major players in the international drug trafficking industry while an
implicit, sinister covenant appears to have developed in some urban communities
between the police and dons ( Johnson, 2005a; compare Harriot, 2003). Former
Senior Superintendent of Police, Reneto Adams, acknowledged this extraordinary situation when he argued that ‘every police station has a don in close
proximity as if they are a contending force. Some have control over the particular
stations and its members and I have problems executing my job consistent with
the law in these circumstances’ (quoted by Balford Henry, 2000, The Jamaica
Gleaner, 31 January). Indeed, it is now established that ‘provided the dons preserve
order within the community, the police will turn a blind eye to the drug trade’
(Rapley, 2003, p. 28).
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This brand of community leadership, however, disguises a more menacing reality.
Although it retains the confidence of some constituents, this type of ‘jungle
justice’ is not always equitably distributed or executed. For example, it does not
apply to the dons or their generals. Our research reveals that although the dons,
in the main, protect women from rapists, they can and do arbitrarily select women
for sexual relations and, in some cases, oblige mothers tacitly to barter their
daughters during negotiations of economic assistance. Further, communities such
as Tivoli Gardens, headed by self-styled don, ‘Dudus’ (aka ‘the President’), may
therefore appear ‘crime free’ only because they are run under a contrived style of
community bureaucracy which the shottas the first author interviewed label ‘one
order’: ‘everybody just meet under one order and those who come to upset that
order – well, you have to make up your mind. The sheriff [referring to the don]
is in town (interview, April 2004, emphases added).
We use the term contrived because the term ‘one order’ or ‘oneness’ is customarily used by the Jamaican Rastafarian sect to refer to an atmosphere of ‘peace,
love and unity’. It is, however, transliterated in the context of the garrison to
suggest the military-like imposition upon the community of a similar kind of
pact.According to the unwritten, non-verbalised rules of this ‘peace pact’, acts of
deviance are perceived to be an affront to the don and his governorship and are
hence avoided. In this sense, the reverence in which community members hold
the don serves as a ready deterrent to crime and maintains order. Residents, in
other words, respect the don and largely display a willingness to abide by the
community’s rules because behaviour is regulated through force and the threat of
force.
Additionally, the long-standing phenomenon which we describe as ‘informer
phobia’ (IP) ensures that the community remains a hostage to the rule of the don.
Operating in like fashion to the Italian Mafia’s ‘omertà’, IP is a less visible but
most potent governing tool in the arsenal of the Jamaican don. Informer phobia
is a fear of providing or being perceived as providing information to state
authority, particularly the police and increasingly to journalists. Extra-legal activities often go unreported because community members fear the consequences
which include being ‘burned out’ of their homes or death. Aided by the cultural
censure of the act of ‘informing’, embodied in the lyrical output of many
Jamaican entertainers, informer phobia covers conversing with a police officer or
visiting a police station as well as the very act of ‘getting involved’ in the legal
system. This can range from being a witness to a crime, giving statements to the
police, pressing charges, assuming jury duty or attending court to give testimony.
Our research also reveals the working of a ‘buy a crowd’ phenomenon whereby
residents are rounded up and ordered on to the streets to protest on behalf of
shottas or as a means to camouflage criminal actions (see Johnson, 2005a). It is
within this realm of autocratic control that the global Mafia and the Jamaican
dons are most akin. But times are changing: over the last two decades the Mafia
in both Italy and the USA has lost substantial shares of its omnipotence.
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A ‘Reversible Destiny’ in Italy and the USA
Especially during the last decade of the twentieth century considerable changes
have taken place in the way state authorities and civil societies in Italy and the
USA have coped with the impact of the Mafia on politics, the economy, the
justice system and general criminality. These shifts in power and reach have been
so dramatic and comprehensive that one author speaks of the ‘decline of the
American Mafia’ (Reuter, 1995) and other well-known scholars in the field
(Schneider and Schneider, 2003; 2005) – make claims of a ‘reversible destiny’ in
Italian regions like Sicily and Calabria.
Since the late 1980s, in the USA especially, the altered structures and performance
of politics and policing have led to a significant loss of power of the American
urban Mafia (Reuter, 1995). At roughly the same time, the Italian state mounted
a serious challenge to the Mafia, in response to which Mafiosi gruesomely
attacked the symbols and representatives of the state.A war between the Mafia and
the state as well as increasing infighting between rival Mafia ‘families’ ensued
(Blok, 2001, p. 97; Chubb, 1996; Jamieson, 2000, pp. 200–35; Stille, 1995). This
(internal) strife led to at least 400 Mafiosi who turned state’s witness, ironically
labelled pentiti (penitents), testifying against other Mafiosi.At the same time, these
internal and external battles generated a palpable exhaustion with ‘mob’ violence
among the Italian public and a powerful resentment against the Mafia, even from
within its own ranks. Although in the early days of the anti-Mafia movement,
some ‘justice collaborators’ were on the losing side of the internal Mafia war
(Siebert, 1996), a small number of former Mafia women – mothers, sisters and
daughters – became state’s evidence, often after suffering the loss of a loved one
and risking their own safety (Fabj, 1998; Siebert, 1996).As a consequence of these
dramatic developments, many Mafiosi, including ‘top brass’ godfathers, were
prosecuted and sentenced to tens of years of imprisonment. Arrests for membership in a Mafia-type organisation increased from 874 in 1991 to a record high of
2,136 in 1994, still being high at 1,324 in 1997 ( Jamieson, 2000, p. 231). Since
that time, the prosecutorial arm of the legal authorities in Sicily has become much
stronger, particularly in light of the fact that the rumours that once destabilised
their operations are no longer pervasive. The arrest of Mafia capo Bernardo
Provenzano in March 2006 – after having been wanted by the police for more
than 40 years – again illustrates the urge with which the Italian legal authorities
now want to terminate the impact of criminal power.
The Mafia’s once secure connections with Italian politics have come under public
scrutiny, contributing to the fall of once powerful politicians, such as former
prime minister Andreotti.Although extortion practices continue to exist in Sicily
and other regions in southern Italy, it is now illegal for businesspeople confronted
with these practices to pay the tribute and withhold testimony. If these laws are
breached, businesspeople run the risk of being charged as Mafia collaborators.
Importantly, the state now claims that the victims of extortion can trust the police
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and the judiciary to protect them. Even though the Mafia pursues its extra-legal
activities, these operations are conducted in a covert and far less sizeable way,
because the organisation is devoid of the legitimacy it once enjoyed ( Jamieson,
2000; Schneider and Schneider, 2003, pp. 291–303).
Unquestionably, the situation is still precarious: extortion practices continue and
the Mafia’s international and transnational linkages are still viable and continue to
spread all over the globe. Mafiosi still try to seek political allies, and experts believe
the Italian Mafia may rise again, if the current anti-Mafia climate becomes less
repressive (e.g. Jamieson, 2000). Nonetheless, important results have been
achieved: the Mafia has been ‘extinguished as a major actor in the United States’
criminal world’ (Reuter, 1995, p. 89), whereas in the eyes of many international
leaders, Palermo, Sicily’s capital city, has become a global model and a promising
if tenuous success story for anti-Mafia campaigns (Schneider and Schneider, 2003,
pp. 284–8, p. 301). Whether the decline of the Italian Mafia is structural and
complete, or merely cyclical (showing potential for resurgence) is, at present,
difficult to deduce (Varese, 2006). Certainly, the passing of anti-Mafia legislation,
state crackdown vis-à-vis the Italian police and greater transparency in the operation of local politics represent the kind of fundamental and systemic changes
which are indispensable in bringing about the structural and enduring decline of
the Mafia.Are these developments an indication of its diminishing global power?
Perhaps not. Indeed, it is worth noting that at a global level, the Mafia is often
compensated by other players in the field of organised crime (Albanian and
Russian Mafia, Chinese triads, Colombian drug lords and Japanese yakuzas), some
of whom are operating in low-profile and/or invisible ways. In this sense, the
decline of the Mafia would perhaps be more accurately regarded as more cyclical
in nature. Yet the downturn of the (Italian and American) Mafia, particularly in
light of the way that the world has known this phenomenon for so long, cannot
be denied. How was this possible, in such a short time and against such a powerful,
long-standing and seemingly entrenched criminal culture?
First of all, it must be noted that – contrary to common opinion – the Mafia in
Italy and elsewhere has never been the result of an ingrained, homogeneous
‘culture’ in the areas concerned. There has always been a plurality of cultures in
the regions in question, including middle-class artisans and intellectuals who have
never been Mafia friendly (Schneider and Schneider, 2005). Also, gametheoretical analyses suggest that the Mafia could never have been completely
successful in enforcing territorial monopolies. The mechanisms of extortion,
threatening and protection will always produce turbulence due to rivalling
‘families’ and other competitors such as ‘faking Mafiosi’, emulous candidates for
succession and people who simply will not cooperate (Smith and Varese, 2001;
compare Blok, 2001). In the USA the Mafia has lost its importance because it was
not keen enough to deal with new competitors such as Colombian and Russian
gangs and find competent successors when leadership had failed or passed away
(Reuter, 1995).
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Probably of more significance is the fact that – both in the USA and Italy – law
enforcement agencies and policies have been considerably strengthened and
professionalised (Reuter, 1995; Schneider and Schneider, 2003). In both nations,
higher-level institutional influences – the federal level in the USA, the European
Union in Italy – have pressured lower-level authorities to address seriously the
entanglement between criminality and politics, to strive radically for transparency
and good governance and more specifically to fight the pervasive illegality in the
urban and rural areas involved. In the case of Italy, the EU simply declines
membership to nations which are in compromised standing in relation to democratic governance, human rights and institutional health. Since the formation of
the EU’s internal market in 1992, all EU member states – hence also Italy (Den
Boer, 1996) – have been forced to improve their judicial, political and administrative systems.Without good governance, EU membership and EU money flows
are simply out of reach of applicant countries (e.g Den Boer and De Kerckhove,
2001), a situation which has been experienced by Romania and Bulgaria. After
official admonishments in May 2006 for not having improved their law enforcement practices sufficiently, these two countries have been admitted to the EU, but
only under the condition that the Union will strictly supervise their measures to
fight corruption, governmental misbehaviour and organised crime. In both countries Mafia-type criminal practices (corruption, extortion, connections between
politics and crime) are still too prevalent to be acceptable for the EU. In organised
crime – also because of its entanglement with terrorist-related crimes – the EU
has found a new enemy with many tentacles; this enemy the EU is resolute to
fight (Den Boer, 2000).
Finally, although often understated in the assessments of the reasons behind Mafia
decline, civil movements worldwide are on the rise, and an ethical and civil
progression can be noticed (Fabj, 1998; Kaldor, 2003; Kymlicka, 2001). This is an
interesting development, which is not unrelated to the point made above of the
existence of a plurality of cultures, not all of which are Mafia-friendly, even in
regions renowned for Mafia ‘infestation’. In Italy, a strong anti-Mafia social
movement consisting of an expanding urban and educated middle class contributed to the defeat of the Mafia. Once the ‘tipping point’ (Gladwell, 2000) had
been reached, the anti-Mafia movement contributed to doing away with the
political practices that had condoned the Mafia’s criminal activities for so long.
Noteworthy is the role of women in this regard. The Association of Women
against the Mafia in Palermo as well as spontaneous movements like the Committee of the Sheets have also played important roles, as have the increasing
number of female mayors who have been elected in Sicily’s countryside over the
last few years (Fabj, 1998, p. 205; Schneider and Schneider, 2003, pp. 294–5). The
progressive ideas of these women proved to be unfertile ground for a flourishing
of the Mafia.As elsewhere in the world, women are increasingly holding the stage
and they use words as their only ‘weapons’, but – so it seems – those words are
effective in realising drastic changes (Soeters, 2005, p. 125; Sung, 2006). Very
recently, at the end of 2006, youngsters in Sicily took over a campaign protesting
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against the extortion practices threatening small shop owners. This ‘Addiopizzo’
movement was supported by the EU, which is funding billboards against stillexisting Mafia practices. One such reads: ‘Contro l’estorsione non sei solo’ (‘Against
extortion, you are not alone’).
What implication – if any at all – do these developments hold for the place and
future of ‘donmanship’ in Jamaica and, in fact, for the whole political, social and
economic situation of this nation which has given so much space to this kind of
subaltern criminal culture?

A ‘Reversible Destiny’ in Jamaica?
Based on the preceding discussion, it is our argument that if the comparison
between the Jamaican dons and the Italian godfathers bears any validity at all, the
fall of the Italian (and USA) Mafia cannot be without significance for Jamaica and
other regions in the developing world where rogue leadership continues to exist.
Admittedly, Jamaican governance has not experienced the kinds of revolutionary shifts that have occurred in the political, social and judicial fabric of Italian
and American societies over the last two decades and that are weakening Mafiosi
to such a noticeable extent. Nonetheless, there are a number of developments
taking place in Jamaica, including state interventionist policies and action within
civil society, with enormous potential impact on organised crime and the power
of dons.
To grasp the significance of these developments, it is important to acknowledge
that over the last 25 years, the Jamaican government and civil society have dealt
with the presence and influence of dons on (electoral and local body) politics, the
justice system, the informal economy and the local community in a variety of
controversial and unproductive ways. For example, our research suggests an
official state response constructed on a contradictory model of, on the one hand,
accommodation (to the hegemony of rogues) and their incorporation into official
law enforcement and community governance, and, on the other, brutal repression
of their criminal practices vis-à-vis aggressive policing.
But times are changing. Paradigmatic shifts in the performance and operations of
the Jamaican state over the last five years, most notably in law enforcement, have
resulted in a noticeable decline in the economic power and political legitimacy of
dons. For example, the Jamaican government, on 19 October 2004, launched a
hardline policing offensive dubbed ‘Operation Kingfish’, designed to dismantle
large organised criminal organisations and gang networks run by dons as well as
to strike at the heart of the narcotics trafficking industry in which they are heavily
involved. Premised upon the combined efforts of the Jamaica Defence and
Constabulary Forces and international (intelligence and law-enforcement) collaboration among the governments of the United States, United Kingdom,
Canada and Jamaica, ‘Operation Kingfish’ has already witnessed considerable
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success.Assistant Commissioner of Police, Glenmore Hinds, confirmed that in the
first year of intense activity, Kingfish confiscated some 50 speedboats (used in the
transnational drug trade), 1,240 firearms, over 2,500 cartridges, 12 tonnes of
cocaine and 4,300 pounds of compressed marijuana and arrested 235 persons for
a range of offences including murder, firearms, ammunition and drug possession
(see The Jamaica Observer, 13 November 2005).
Of extraordinary significance has been the arrest, imprisonment and successful
conviction of some of Jamaica’s most notorious ‘mob bosses’ and warlords. For
example, in 2005, the leader of the infamous Gideon Warriors Gang, Joel Andem,
who held prominent status on the police’s ‘most wanted’ list for over a decade for
numerous crimes, including murder, was sentenced to 30 years in prison. This is
while his co-leader, Kevin Tyndale was condemned to 90 years’ imprisonment.
Likewise, in 2006, Donald ‘Zekes’ Phipps – don of the Mathews Lane community
and a high-flying henchman of the ruling People’s National party – was tried for
murder, found guilty and sentenced to 30 years in jail. At the time of writing,
extradition proceedings were also under way for two other Jamaican crime lords,
named by the US government as major ‘drug trafficking kingpins’. These developments not only suggest that the judicial apparatus of the Jamaican legal system
is becoming more effective, but are especially significant since the previous
inability of the state to prosecute dons successfully had resulted in widespread loss
of confidence in the police and given credence to the notion that the state lacked
the political will to tackle organised crime. In this regard, the conviction of ‘Zekes’
(after escaping jail on several previous occasions on account of absent/unwilling
witnesses and lack of evidence) created the biggest stir in the Jamaican criminal
underworld and underscored the urgency of the state to drive down crime levels.
Also noteworthy is the seizure of (go-fast) boats used to convey drugs across
international waters and the disabling of illegal airstrips used to land drug planes,
also part of the new organised crime-busting strategy of the Jamaican government. Of a total of twelve criminal organisations targeted by ‘Operation Kingfish’,
seven have been completely dismantled – the Klansman and Mathews Lane gangs,
traditionally allied to the People’s National party; the One Order Gang associated
with the main opposition, the Jamaica Labour party, as well as the One Ten,Top
Road, Ryan Richards and the Steve ‘Mop Head’ Halliman gangs based in
Kingston. Other gangs have experienced severe disruptions in their operations
due to inter-gang rivalry and the killing of some members by the security forces
in open confrontations (see Williams, 2005, The Jamaica Observer, 13 November).
Although the latter is not necessarily a positive development, the Jamaican
government, through its security outfit, has, at times, felt compelled to respond
forcefully to upsurges in criminality by deploying coercive and occasionally
deadly measures. These surges in criminal violence are often the result of the
violent confrontations between and within gangs as they struggle for turf,
particularly in circumstances where state infiltration has dramatically disrupted
the flow of transnational drug trafficking, and hence the extraordinary income to
© 2007 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2007 Political Studies Association
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2008, 56(1)

184

H U M E N. J O H N S O N A N D J O S E P H L . S O E T E R S

be accrued from it (Phillips, 2004, p. 4). Admittedly, however, the human rights
abuses and assaults on the poor which often attend these operations suggest that
such tactics will ultimately prove to be untenable (see Johnson, 2005b). It is also
important to note that many Jamaican gangs maintain a ready pool of recruits to
replace those who have been imprisoned or killed. The tussle over leadership
therefore makes this context prone to a seemingly higher proclivity for violence.
This is because unlike the Italian Mafia, which is strongly rooted in fictive kinship
as well as real kin relations, Jamaican gangs have often had to fall back on coercive
power to maintain their internal unity. Yet it is of extraordinary theoretical and
political significance that the expected violent tussle for the leadership of
Mathews Lane in Western Kingston in the aftermath of the arrest and imprisonment of its area leader, Donald ‘Zekes’ Phipps, did not materialise. ‘Crime-wise,
they have been very quiet’ is the assessment by the Jamaican police, premised on
the noticeable absence of a successor don, the customary feuding with rival
communities and the unprecedented opening of the community to ‘outsiders’
(the removal of roadblocks, clearing of streets and staging of shindigs). Notwithstanding the precariousness and fragility of peace there, Mathews Lane residents
have experienced some reprieve, in their own words: ‘now everyman equal,
everyman have a say, nobody no [don’t] rule nobody’ (see The Star newspaper, 28
February 2007, p. 3).
Of remarkable significance also is the increasing professionalisation of the Jamaican police force, the strengthening of policy and the modernisation of the law
enforcement infrastructure (Phillips, 2004; cf. Harriot, 2003). This includes the
installation of technology such as Closed Circuit Television Surveillance Systems
(CCTV) in public spaces in the Kingston metropolitan area and an Automated
Fingerprint Identification System (APFIS) as well as the purchase of additional
police vehicles, including some 220 motor vehicles, 100 motorcycles and six
patrol boats for the Marine police. There has also been an intense recruitment and
training of additional police personnel, including the present deployment of
police officers from the United Kingdom’s Scotland Yard. The latter is designed
to improve the intelligence-gathering capability and crime-scene investigative
skills of the Jamaican police (Phillips, 2004; Williams, 2005; The Jamaica Observer,
13 November).
Perhaps of more political purchase is the introduction by the Jamaican state, in
recent years, of robust ‘anti-Mafia’ legislation such as the Plea Bargaining Act and
Proceeds of Crime Bill as well as amendments to the Money Laundering and
Corruption Prevention Acts. These critical legislative moves are aimed at weakening the financial power base of criminal bosses by seizing their assets and
disrupting the avenues to profit that give context to criminal empires (Phillips,
2004). Of course, as in Italy, extortion remains central to the power of Jamaican
dons and key to their economic wealth. There is, however, as yet no comprehensive strategy outlined or undertaken by the Jamaican state to combat a
rampant extortion trade in the country’s busy commercial districts despite the
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increasingly brutal and coercive strategies employed by extortionists in Jamaica to
keep it viable, including the murder of over fourteen businessmen since 1999.
Extortion, though, never simply leads to a perfect hegemony by crime lords in an
area (Smith andVarese, 2001). In fact, continuous ‘infighting’ between competitors
in the extortion industry creates continuing turbulence, thus enabling changes to
occur in the criminal domain (Charles, 2002). In such circumstances, the restoration of peace is no longer the preserve of criminal dons but, instead, obliges the
intervention of the higher authority of the state. As we noted above, crimebusting initiatives which assume, as a strategy, out-and-out confrontation with
armed gangs, have in the past merely served to heighten distrust of the police and
have increased citizen protests against ‘police brutality’. As a result, new fillip is
being given to the community policing strategy by the Jamaican state.Admittedly,
many garrisonised Jamaican communities are overrun with violent gangs and
citizens who deeply mistrust the police and hence do not easily allow for
community policing. The police have, nonetheless, managed to tap into pockets
of support within some communities by being more transparent about their law
enforcement activities, successes and failures.
It is now widely perceived that it is to police officers operating in more amenable
and amiable ways with residents in communities over which dons preside and/or
criminal gangs establish their bases that are owed, in part, the recent successes of
‘Operation Kingfish’. Indeed, since 2006, the police have reported that, for the
first time in several years, violent crimes, particularly murders, have trended
downwards by a significant 26 per cent, thanks to the assistance of the community
policing unit and more innovative policing strategies in general (The Jamaica
Observer, 10 September 2006).
To really address the robustness of criminal gangs in Jamaica also requires the
support of civil society. Indeed, it is when citizens decline to participate in real
ways in the governance and conduct of their lives and communities, including
withdrawal from popular participation in law enforcement, that dubious actors
with contradictory goals assume responsibility for governance (Barber, 1984;
compare Mason, 2005; Strange, 1996).Although Jamaica has a diverse civil society
and myriad civic organisations (Munroe, 1999; 2000), these are usually seen to be
ambivalent and sedate (Gray, 2003; compare interview, 2004). However, mushrooming crime rates, including some 1,674 cases of homicide in 2005 alone
(Police Crime Statistics, Jamaica Constabulary Force) and an unprecedented quotient of fear of crime, have created a Jamaican citizenry increasingly exhausted
with criminality and angry with the perceived complicity of the state in the
hegemony of dons and what many still perceive as lacklustre efforts in combating
crime. The result has been an increased intensity of episodic mobilisations in the
streets by loosely organised networks of citizens, particularly women and students,
who desire to exhibit their fearless opposition to criminal violence in their
communities (see Myers, 2004).
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Not unlike Italy, significant elements of the Jamaican working and disadvantaged
classes are clearly huge supporters of efforts to rid their communities of extralegal actors. Whether embodied in civic initiatives such as marches, prayer vigils
and crusades organised by the church, covert attempts to provide information to
the police or the lyrical output of reggae and dance hall entertainers, there are
always people who try to escape the don’s reach and power. Moreover, like Italy
and elsewhere, Jamaican women (especially within the context of the historically significant accession of Jamaica’s first female prime minister, Portia SimpsonMiller) are becoming a force in themselves, raising their voices against criminality
and injustice, and gaining power in popular street mobilisations as well as in the
political arena ( Johnson, forthcoming; Myers, 2004).While impoverishment and
fear keep some women trapped in the situation of being economic clients of
patron-dons, and filial bonds prevent others from assuming the much-desired
anti-don stance, the evident courage of women in the face of real danger may
contribute to real changes in the status and authority of dons in the country. The
following quotations from a cross-section of Jamaican citizens represent an
emerging consensus that Jamaican dons are not legitimate civic actors and
therefore cannot retain real membership in civil society:
P1:

Community dons need to stop believing the hype that they get. I do not
regard any don because my idea of a don or a area leader is one who supposed
to set an example in him community where youths a pick up a gun, him tell
them to put it down, where youths a follow him because him a set an
example, not an example to say him is a thug and you can kill and rape. If his
idea of being a don is to cause no war to go on in his area but war [going on]
around a next man area, him can go way [bugger off]. Him not contributing
positively.

P2:

No, they [dons] are not a part of civil society, no, no. They are part of the
citizenry. No, no. If they are dealing with criminal activity, they are abhorrent
to the very spirit of togetherness in the society.

P3:

There are involved in extreme cases of wrongdoing and that cannot be
encouraged. A don to me is not a person who kills people.

P4:

No sir, there is no place in civil society for them. The only place for them
as far as I am concerned is in jail.4

In the same breath, there has been public indignation in recent years, propelled by
the media, over the cosy, symbiotic relationship fostered between the political
establishment and members of the organised crime industry. This included the
daily publishing of the details of vicious crimes as front-page stories, statistics
illustrating mounting crime levels and letters from ordinary citizens expressing
outrage at the state. This public objection resulted in the reluctant ‘outing’ of the
role of politicians in legitimising donmanship. Nowadays, there is a less explicit or
public display of alliance between politicians and dons and the generation of a
public rhetoric by both political officials and citizens of ‘the need for political
disassociation’ between these entities (see Ritch, 2001; Mills, 2001; The Jamaica
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Gleaner, 20 May). Whereas this push from civil society has had the effect of
exposing the ingrained linkages between criminal enterprise and politics, the
mutually dependent relationship which has been cultivated and sustained for more
than half a century between dons and the political order clearly requires more than
rhetoric to shatter.After all, if political parties are to be viewed as a vital part of the
functioning of the state as well as an indispensable element of a mobilised and
engaged civil society, then those within its employ cannot serve to undermine it.
Like Italy, Jamaica also knows a middle-class-based civil society, comprised of
intellectuals, professionals and a sizeable merchant element whose constituents
favour good governance, healthy economic and social institutions and are, for the
most part,anti-dons and donmanship. The middle class is likely to profit most from
institutional reforms which deepen its affinity for that agenda. Of crucial purchase
therefore is that this very powerful merchant class,itself often accused of complicity
in the extortion practices of dons (Henry,2000;The Jamaica Gleaner, January 31) and
detached from the problems in the society, has – for the first time – pledged its
financial support for the government’s latest initiatives to tackle organised crime.
It is important to emphasise here, however, that unlike Italy within the context of
the tenets of membership in the European Union, Jamaica does not, at present,
experience immediate pressure from higher political levels, despite the existence
and increasing influence of a regional political body, the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM). As such, we reiterate that the reasons dons and donmanship have
persisted in Jamaica is powerfully connected to those that informed its development – a compromised Jamaican state, which continues to foster a symbiotic
co-dependent relationship with alternative, outlaw authorities through the contrary patron–client practices of some Members of Parliament and a police force,
some members of which continue to be in collusion with narcotics trafficking
and banditry. Although the government is emphatic that it has no current ties
with dons, informal practices by public officials in reality constitute de facto
approval of their autonomy and independent authority. As a consequence, dons,
like their Mafia counterparts worldwide, find themselves in the haughty position
of being able to operate outside the rule of law. Nevertheless, the United Nations
and other supranational institutions such as the World Trade Organisation, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are increasingly stressing the
importance of good governance; the World Bank even going so far as explicitly
demanding good governance and the disappearance of corruption as preconditions to the funding of large-scale projects.5 If this policy holds, small developing
countries, including Jamaica, will need to address comprehensively the current
illegal practices of donmanship which are currently compromising the country’s
political, administrative and judicial systems.

Concluding Remarks
All in all, pursuing the comparison between Jamaica’s dons and Italian godfathers
may lead one to become somewhat optimistic about the island’s future. If
© 2007 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2007 Political Studies Association
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2008, 56(1)

188

H U M E N. J O H N S O N A N D J O S E P H L . S O E T E R S

representatives of the middle and disadvantaged classes, including Jamaican
women and members of the reggae and dance-hall industries, feel increasingly
confident in playing a role centre stage, and if authorities are serious about the
‘de-garrisonisation’ of urban communities and are able to evade the risk of
the ‘wars on crime’ becoming assaults on the poor (compare Schneider and
Schneider, 2003, p. 301), then – perhaps – Jamaica may undergo a decline of
‘don-power’ in much the same manner as Italy and the USA have experienced
the downturn of the Mafia. In such a case, Jamaica may also encounter a
‘reversible destiny’.
Previously, scholars planning to study the Mafia in Sicily were often warned
against the risks they would run doing their fieldwork. This situation has clearly
changed for the better. The first author of this article was explicitly told of the
dangers and politics involved in conducting field studies on Jamaican donmanship. Perhaps, in some future, other scholars will be able to do this work in
Jamaica’s communities without seeking advanced consent from dons or facing
warnings of possible compromises to their safety. If this article contributes to such
a development, it will have fulfilled its intentions.
(Accepted: 22 November 2006)
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Notes
Portions of this article were presented at the New Zealand Political Science Association Conference, Hamilton, 22–24
November 2004, and the Research Committee on the Armed Forces and Society (International Political Science
Association) Conference, Shanghai, 28–29 June 2005. This essay partially relies on fieldwork conducted in Jamaica by
the first author, as part of her PhD thesis (When Citizen Politics Becomes Uncivil: Between Popular Protest and
Governance in Jamaica). The authors wish to acknowledge the comments and inspiration received from Priya Kurian,
Patrick Barrett and Christopher Charles as well as the well-informed comments of two anonymous reviewers.
1 For many, the word godfather evokes the image of the Godfather movies which, as many film scholars have pointed
out, represent the Mafia in an overly romantic and somewhat misleading way. In this sense, this article helps to
demystify the Mafia phenomenon.
2 Gangsters, robbers and ‘shottas’ (shooters) are not to be misconstrued as dons. Gangsters and shottas engage solely in
criminal activities and do not possess the enormous wealth and clout of the don. They are nonetheless crucial
members of the don’s vast network of hirelings. They tend to fall at the lower end of a rigid hierarchical command
structure and aspire to occupy the envied role of don or area leader. Where there is an absence of centralised
leadership such as in the case of the death of a don or infighting among the ambitious, a vacancy in the leadership
structure may usher in fundamental changes in the socio-economic and political variables at play in this social space.
See Charles, 2002, p. 41; The Jamaica Gleaner, 20 May 2001, ‘Death of a Don’; Radio Interview, HOT 102 FM, 16
April 2004.
3 The second quotation is from a self-styled gangster the first author interviewed during field research in Jamaica
between 2003 and 2004.
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4 These quotations are based on field interviews with Jamaican citizens carried out between 2003 and 2004 in Jamaica
by the first author. Quoted respectively are a female Rastafarian entertainer, former Member of Parliament and
Minister of Justice, a radio disc jockey and a senior police officer. ‘P’ here indicates ‘participant’.
5 O. Velthuis, ‘No Money for Grabbing Governments’, Volkskrant, 27 February 2006. See also Drezner (2001).
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